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Biocontrol Agents and Plant Inoculants: Implications for Strengthening the BTWC 
 
By Simon Whitby 
 
Article I of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention1 (BTWC) on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction in 1972 states that:  
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin 
or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents 
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
 
Concern has been expressed, particularly in the last decades, regarding the effectiveness 
of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention regime in the light of the rapid pace of 
scientific and technological developments.  
 
Provision is included under Article XII of the Convention that periodic reviews of the 
implementation of the Convention would take place and that during the course of such 
reviews assessments of scientific and technological developments would be compiled by 
Co-Depositories and States Parties, thus: 
 
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is 
requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to 
this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the 
Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the 
Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the 
provisions of the Convention,[…] are being realized. Such review shall take into 
account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The text of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
Their Destruction is available at, http://www.opbw.org. 
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Recent Concern 
 
In 2001, scientific and technological developments in the area of plant biology were 
identified as being of particular significance to the Convention and to future efforts to 
strengthen the Convention against their hostile use. In a statement2 by the South African 
Delegation to the Fifth Review Conference of the 19 November 2001, Peter Goosen, 
Chief Director: Peace and Security, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, reminded 
States Parties that in all of the work undertaken by States Parties related to the BWTC, 
the threat against plants was usually considered to be of a lower priority or importance 
than the threat against humans. This had occurred, Goosen pointed  out, in spite of the 
widespread appreciation amongst States Parties that major elements of past biological 
weapons programmes since the 1920’s had been directed against crops and that numerous 
plant pathogens had been researched, developed and produced together with weapons as 
part of offensive BW programmes for the purpose of the widespread dissemination of 
anti-crop agents3. 
 
Goosen’s comments were intended to draw our attention to a much neglected issue area, 
namely, the rapidly advancing pace of scientific, technological, and commercial 
development of biocontrol agents and plant inoculants, their widespread application, and 
their related production facilities, and of their role in the threat against plants. 
 
In its closing remarks, the South African Statement reflected on the failure of the Ad Hoc 
Group (AHG) to meet its mandate – to negotiate and agree a legally binding Protocol to 
strengthen the 1972 Convention prior to the BTWC’s Fifth Review Conference in 2001. 
However, at the time of its publication, the South African Statement could not have 
anticipated at the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention, the proposed termination 
of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group itself together with its limited but useful focus on 
how States Parties to the Convention might strengthen the prohibition inter alia in respect 
of this much neglected issue; the subsequent adjournment of the Fifth Review Conference 
for a period of twelve months until November 2002; and, the further marginalisation of 
the issue in question in the new nationally-focused so-called inter Review Conference 
process.4  
                                                 
2 Statement by Peter Goosen, Chief Director: Peace and Security, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 
Geneva, 19, November 2001, South African Delegation to the Fifth Review Conference of the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/5rc/docs/statements/5RC-OS-SAFRICA.pdf.   
3 For a systematic study of such state offensive anti-crop biological warfare programmes, see: Whitby, S. 
(2001) Biological Warfare against Crops, Palgrave, London. 
4 At its eighth plenary meeting on 14 November 2002, the Conference decided by consensus, as follows:(a) 
To hold three annual meetings of the States parties of one week duration each year commencing in 2003 
until the Sixth Review Conference, to be held not later than the end of 2006, to discuss, and promote 
common understanding and effective action on: i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to 
implement the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; ii.  
National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms 
and toxins; iii.  Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the 
effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; iv.  
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As Pearson and Sims5 have pointed out, the Review Conference is   “a vital element in 
the evolution of the BTWC”. As we look forward toward to 2006, this paper is intended 
to facilitate the preparation by States Parties for a successful outcome at the Sixth Review 
Conference of the Convention, and it is both timely and instructive to develop an 
evaluation of work since entry-into-force of the BTWC by focusing specifically on 
information relating to scientific and technological developments submitted by Co-
Depositaries and by States Parties in the area of biological control6 as part of the Review 
Conference process.  
 
This paper first defines plant inoculants and biocontrol agents and offers a brief overview 
of the ways in which such agents are used for peaceful purposes. Second it sets down a 
systematic review of the work of States Parties during the periodic reviews of the 
Conventions implementation in the light of scientific and technological developments 
affecting biological control. Finally, it concludes with recommendations relating to how 
the BTWC could be strengthening regarding biocontrol agents and plant inoculants. Such 
recommendations might be usefully considered by States Parties and acted on prior to the 
Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC in 2006. 
 
 
Biocontrol Agents and Plant Inoculants  
 
Biocontrol agents are living organisms, such as bacteria, fungi, insects, mites or weeds, or 
microorganisms that are used in the control of microbes or other organisms. A large 
number of biocontrol agents are currently available, for example, in the US, where they 
are marketed as biopesticides and include bacteria such as Agrobacterium, the widely-
used Bacillus thuringiensis that produces a protein toxic to species of insects pests 
belonging to the orders lepidoptera (caterpillars), diptera (flies), and coleoptera (beetles 
and weevils), Pseudomonas, and Streptomyces. Further biopesticides include fungi such 
as Ampelomyces, Candida, Coniothyrium, and Trichoderma.7  
 
Plant inoculants are formulations containing living microorganisms, used in the treatment 
and propagation of seeds and plant propagation materiel for enhancing growth and 
disease resistance in plants. They are also used for the restoration of the microflora of 
soil.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for 
the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and 
plants; and, v.  The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
5 Bradford Review Conference Paper No 10, Preparing for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006, 
by Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, February 2005, p. 5. Available at: 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc. 
6  For the purposes of this discussion the term biological control agent will be used, where appropriate to do 
so, to refer to both biocontrol agents and plant inoculants. 
7 McSpadden Gardener, B. B., and Fravel, D. R. 2002. Biological control of plant pathogens: Research, 
commercialisation, and application in the USA. Online, Plant Health Progress doi:10.1094/PHP-2002-
0510-01-RV. 
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The BTWC Review Conference Process, Scientific and Technological Developments, 
and the Relevance to the Convention of Biological Control Agents  
 
The need to strengthen the Convention had been recognised since it was opened for 
signature in 1972 and the BTWC has remained what Tucker has described more recently 
as essentially a “gentleman’s agreement”8 that lacked measures to verify that States 
Parties were in compliance with their treaty obligations. In addition to the absence of the 
inclusion of verification measures and concerns over compliance, another central concern 
was that inter alia the Convention did not adequately cover future scientific and 
technological developments. Indeed it is apparent that such developments have proceeded 
at a much more rapid pace than had been envisaged at the time of the conclusion of the 
Convention and it is now timely to evaluate the work of States Parties in addressing this 
issue in the light of these developments. 
  
 
First Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 1980. 
 
Prior to the First Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention a 
meeting of the Preparatory Committee was held in Geneva from 9 to 18 July 1979. The 
Preparatory Committee decided to request the Secretariat to prepare a background paper 
on compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention.  The 
Preparatory Committee also decided to request the Depositary Governments to prepare a 
background paper9 on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention and, in addition, to invite States Parties who wished to do so to submit their 
views on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. In 
addition, the Preparatory Committee decided to request that the Secretary of the 
Committee should invite the comments of States Parties on the background paper to be 
provided by the Depositary Governments and to compile these comments along with 
national contributions on the subject.  
 
The review10 of scientific and technological developments was prepared by experts of the 
Depositary Governments and focussed only on major developments that appeared to have 
direction connexion with a review of the Convention’s operation. The review of scientific 
developments titled: New scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was organised 
into the following subsections focussing on I. Recombinant DNA Techniques; II. New 
Infectious Diseases; III. Chemical Synthesis of Toxins; IV. The Industrial Use of 
                                                 
8 Jonathan Tucker, J. Tucker, Strengthening the BWC: Moving Toward a Compliance Protocol, Arms 
Control Today, January/February, 1998, p.20. 
9 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF I/5, 6 February 1980. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
10 Not all States Parties submitted information to the Secretary General of the United Nations that referred 
either directly or indirectly to potential problems posed be the use of microbial agents against crops. For the 
purpose of this discussion it has been necessary to refer selectively from the official documentation 
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Fermentation Techniques; V. Microbial Control of Pests; and, VI. Scientific and 
Technological Findings. 
 
Section V. of the above review relates to Microbial Control of Pests11. Driven in part by a 
concerns for human health and the environment relating to the use of synthetic chemical 
pesticides; and by concern relating to the efficacy of the use of such agents and the 
natural ability of plants to develop resistance to their use, the review notes that there had 
been a remarkable increase in interest in this area and summarises its relevance to the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as follows: 
 
Microbiological methods involve the large-scale production of certain live 
micro-organisms or their extractable toxins, the formulation of a liquid or 
powder product and dissemination of the product by vehicle or aircraft-borne 
sprays (or in rodent control, the use of ground bait) over crops or forests. With 
live microbial agents death of insect or rodent occurs through infection; with 
microbial toxins death is produced by toxic effects. In some basic respects the 
whole sequence resembles biological warfare (emphasis added). 
 
The review of scientific and technological developments summarises how viral, bacterial 
and fungal agents of relevance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention are 
produced and disseminated in the following table: 
 
 
 
Viruses Nuclear polyhedrosis and granulosis viruses: produced on a large-scale by a 
few nations, using mass rearing of insect hosts. The viruses extracted at a 
concentration of 12 x 106 infective unites/ml are sprayed by aircraft. Viral 
insecticides are more expensive to produce than bacterial insecticides but they 
have the possible advantage of high target-specificity. 
Bacteria Bacillus thruingiensis: produced by several nations on a multi-tonne basis in 
deep-aerated vessels. The final product contains about 3 x 1010 bacterial 
spores/g. and is stable for 2 to 3 years. Disseminated by aircraft spray as 
liquid or powder aerosol, the bacterium is highly valued for controlling a wide 
variety of insect pests.  
 Bacillus popillae: is another agent produced and used in much the same way 
as Bacillus thrungiensis for controlling Japanese beetle larvae. 
 Pseudomanas seruginosa (and Pl. fluorescens) and Chromobacterium 
prodigiosum: produced and used in a few countries for dissemination by 
aircraft spray on reserviours (at 10 x 106 organisms/cm2 water surface) in 
mosquito larvae control. These agents are, however, facultative pathogens for 
man.  
                                                 
11 Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF I/5, 6 February 1980. Appendix E. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
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Fungi Various species such as Trichoderma, Sporotrichum, Beauveria and 
Cuelomemvces are produced on a multi-tonne basis by several nations. They 
are disseminated by aircraft spray to infect insect pests and sometimes to 
attack other fungal diseases of crops. Additionally, a number of other 
microbial agents are currently being studies, or evaluated in field trails.  
 
In spite of similarities between the process of production for peaceful use of agents used 
in the microbial control of pests and their means of dissemination and the relevance of 
this to the development and production of biological warfare agents the review noted that 
the risks posed, “…appeared to be outweighed by the significant peaceful potential in this 
method of pest control”.12 Further to this the Scientific and Technological Findings of the 
review noted that such developments, “…do not appear to alter substantially capabilities 
or incentives for the development or production of biological or toxin weapons”.13  
 
As a consequence no changes were thought appropriate to be included in the Final 
Declaration of the First Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention and thus no extended understandings of Article I relating to the scope of the 
Convention were required in 1980 with respect to relevant science and technological 
developments in the area of plants. Article I of the Final Declaration 14 of the First 
Review Conference thus reads: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the Article which defines the 
scope of the Convention and reaffirms its support for the provisions of this 
Article. 
 
The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently comprehensive to 
have covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention. 
 
Second Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 1986. 
 
The Second Review Conference was held in Geneva for three weeks from 8 to 26 
September 1986. As in the case of the First Review Conference of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review 
Conference decided to request each of the Depositary Governments, to submit to the 
Review Conference information on new scientific and technological developments 
relevant to the Convention. The Committee also decided to invite State Parties who 
wished to do so to communicate to the Secretary General of the United Nations their 
views on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. In 
the case of the 1986 Second Review Conference the Co-Depositaries and States Parties 
therefore prepared and distributed to all States Parties separate national papers on new 
                                                 
12 Ibid. Appendix E, p. 292.  
13 Op cit. Appendix E. p. 292. 
14  Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, BWC/CONF.1/10, II Final Declaration, available at: 
http://www.opbw.org. 
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scientific and technological developments of relevance to the BTWC prior to the 
Conference.  
 
The review by States Parties of scientific and technological developments was titled: 
Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.15 The 
submission by Sweden noted that the use of micro-organisms in the control of plant pests 
had increased with the technique spreading to more countries.  According to Sweden: 
 
Knowledge and techniques for large-scale production of insect pathogens 
(bacteria and viruses) and methods for aerosol dissemination have been 
developed which have many similarities with methods essential for employing 
biological warfare agents. 
 
Sweden, however, went on to acknowledge that in accordance with the understanding 
that resulted from the First Review Conference that regardless of the production method, 
the results of new scientific and technological advances were covered by the Convention. 
 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland contribution16 was organised 
into the following sub sections preceded by 1. an Introduction: 2. Biotechnology, 3. New 
Infectious Diseases, 4. Toxins, 5. Industrial Microbiology, 6. Microbial Control of Pests, 
and 7. Conclusions. The UK contribution noted the analogies between the peaceful 
methods of microbial pest control and BW that had been drawn at the previous Review 
Conference; and included significant information regarding the extent to which interest 
had increased in the area of the production of microbial control of pests and their means 
of dissemination. The UK paper offered an assessment of increase in interest biological 
control and noted apparent changes to the methods of production17: 
 
Increases in use since 1980 have not been spectacular except possibly in the 
nations of Eastern Europe, where Lepidoptera pests are a greater agricultural 
problem than elsewhere. In such nations about 30 different microbial 
preparations or formulations have been developed and some are produced on 
often multi-tonne scales. GE [genetic engineering] is being applied in many 
nations to the development of improved and novel agents for pest control. 
                                                 
15 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF. 11/4; and BWC/CONF. 11/4/Add, 1, and 
BWC/CONF. 11/4/Add.2. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
16 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF. 11/4, 6. Microbial Control of Pests, p. 8. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
17 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF. 11/4, paragraph 6.2, p.8. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
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Obviously large-scale industrial microbiology is a key aspect of production…. 
Insect viruses for pest control continue to be relatively expensive to produce but 
the possibility that viruses could be more cheaply and effectively produced 
through GE, rather than by bulk production in insects, is likely to result in 
widely-adopted production methods in nations where susceptible pests are a 
problem.  
  
Regarding methods of dissemination for microbial methods of pest control the UK 
contribution18 noted the following: 
 
Methods of dissemination of microbial pest control agents continue to be the 
subject of increasing R& D and trials. Mobile jet-engined devices are capable of 
disseminating agent aerosols, notably insect viruses, over vast tracts of land. 
There has been continuing R & D on ultra-low volume spraying systems, 
methods of studying spray deposition, formulations, the problems of 
disseminating dusts and powders, micro-encapsulation and other relevant topics.  
 
A section on recent developments of relevance to the Convention in regard to the 
microbial control of pests was also included in the UK contribution which noted the 
following: 
 
 Recent developments of relevance include: 
a. GE-derived bacteria with high toxin yields 
b.  The production through GE, of toxins in species beyond those bacteria which 
produce them in nature. 
c.  Development of formulations aimed at enhanced retention of microbial viability 
during storage and in aerosol. 
d.  Protection of aerosolised micro-organisms by the incorporation of protective UV-
light screening dyes.  
e. Improvements in the spray-drying and milling of micro-organisms and toxins. 
f. The formulation of synergistic combinations of live micro-organisms and toxic 
anti-coagulants, together with drug delivery systems.  
g.  Development of automated production lines for insects, used in the production of 
some viruses.  
h. Vastly increased knowledge on aerobiological aspects of dissemination and the 
elucidation of the factors which control viability and stability in dissemination, 
aerosol and in respect of persistence.  
i.  Computer controlled continuous culture systems and improved purification 
systems. 
 
                                                 
18 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF. 11/4, paragraph 6.3, p.8. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
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In its concluding remarks the UK contribution noted a greater potential for abuse across a 
range of civil capabilities than was present at the time of the First Review Conference in 
1980. In particular with regard to microbial methods of pest control, it noted : 
 
..the “biotechnology explosion” in the civil sectors of many nations and the 
realization of the potentials of GE and industrial microbiology. We have drawn 
attention again to developments in microbial methods of pest control and to the 
increasing knowledge of nations in the large-scale production and dissemination 
of micro-organisms and microbial products. Such developments in the civil 
sector are relevant to the BWC and could be abused to support offensive 
programmes.  
 
Whilst no other contributions by States Parties addressed the problems posed by the 
microbial control of pest the contribution from the United States (US) included in its 
general concluding remarks observations of relevance to this area. The US contribution 
noted the following: 
 
In many ways, recent progress in biological technology affects the ease of 
concealment of manufacturing plants and the availability of new delivery 
systems….Verification of the Convention, always a difficult task, has been 
significantly complicated by the new technology. The confidence derived from 
the belief that certain technical problems would make biological weapons 
unattractive for the foreseeable future has eroded. The ease and rapidity of 
genetic manipulation, the ready availability of a variety of production equipment, 
the proliferation of safety and environmental equipment and health procedures to 
the number of  laboratories and production facilities throughout the world, are 
signs of the growing role of biotechnology in the world’s economy. But these 
very same signs also give concern for the possibility of misuse of this 
biotechnology to subvert the Convention. 
 
As at the First Review Conference, the Second Review Conference in its Final 
Declaration19 reaffirmed that the scope of the Convention covers all scientific and 
technological developments but also agreed to reaffirmations and extended 
understandings of relevance to the area, inter alia, of biological control as follows: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms 
that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments. 
 
                                                 
19 Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, Final Document, Part II, 
Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.II/13/II. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all 
naturally or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production. Consequently, toxins (both 
proteinaceous and non- proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable 
nature and their synthetically produced analogues are covered.  
 
Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 1991. 
 
The Preparatory Committee for the Third Review Conference was held in Geneva from 8 
to 12 April 1991. As had happened prior to the Second Review Conference, the 
Preparatory Committee requested the preparation of background papers by the Secretariat 
on the compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention and 
on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.   
 
The Third Review Conference was held in Geneva for three weeks from 9 to 27 
September 1991. As at the Second Review Conference the Secretariat distributed papers 
containing information provided by Co-Depository States and by other States Parties on 
new scientific and technological developments of relevance to the Convention20. The 
review by States Parties dated 26 August 1991, on scientific and technological 
developments was, as during the Second Review Conference titled: Background 
Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction21.   
 
The submission by Australia included a note in its general introductory remarks to its 
section titled: Impact of recent advances in science and technology on the Biological 
Weapons Convention22, regarding the continued exploitation since the Second Biological 
Weapons Convention Review Conference in 1986, of biotechnology in the fields of 
medicine and agriculture which has lead to: 
 
…major advances in the production, harvesting and preservation of micro-
organisms and plant and animal cells. National capabilities for the large-scale 
production of micro-organisms and cell products have increased as the 
industrial potential in the exploitation of biotechnology has been recognised. 
While this has been beneficial from the point of view of public health and 
agriculture, at has also the potential, if misused, to provide the expertise and 
experience needed for developing and producing BW agents.  
 
As was noted in the review of scientific and technological developments provided at the 
First Review conference, the Australian submission cited environmental concern as a 
major driver in the increase in research into biological control. Australia also noted in a 
                                                 
20 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF. III/4. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
21 Ibid.  
22 Op cit. Impact of recent advances in science and technology on the Biological Weapons Convention. 
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sub section titled: Dissemination and Delivery, similarities in the scientific and 
technological production of both biological control and BW agents thus:  
 
Many of the problems encountered in applying biological control are similar to 
problems that would be encountered in BW. Agents are readily inactivated by 
exposure to air, or to ultraviolet light (sunlight) or by desiccation. Methods of 
microencapsulation of agents have helped to overcome these problems. 
Microencapsulation involves covering particles or droplets of an organism or 
toxin with a thin but very protective coat which will release the agent when it 
reaches a target environment (eg inner lung). The size and the smoothness of 
micocapsules can be controlled so that they will disperse well and carry properly 
through or with the air to their target. Such control would also allow easier, 
standardized weaponization or spraying methods for a range of agents. The 
inclusion of UV protective pigments such as those that have recently been 
discovered in marine soft corals and sponges would provide further protection of 
aerosolised micro-organisms. The dissemination methods for biological 
pesticides have also improved, with the development of low-volume spraying 
devices and jet engined sprayers. These methods are as applicable to BW agents 
as to microbial pesticides.  
 
In its concluding remarks the Australian submission noted the worldwide spread of 
biotechnology-related capabilities and with that the increased possibility of its misuse.  
 
In its review of scientific and technological developments since 1986, the UK in its 
subsection 2 titled: General Developments Relevant to the BWC, noted the increasing 
emphasis being placed in educational provision for students worldwide on issues related 
to GM and biotechnology techniques: 
 
There has been an increase in teaching and research programmes on the 
principles involved in applications of biotechnology, including post graduate 
courses specifically aimed at students from developing countries. Study areas 
include process biotechnology and specifically the scale-up of operations using 
GM materials, the genome engineering of plants in order to improve disease 
resistance, and the biocontrol of plant pathogens and of insects including by 
infection with fungi…. 
 
In its concluding remarks to subsection 2, the UK submission raised areas of concern 
relating to advances in the area of scientific and technological developments: 
 
There has been steady refinement of those biotechnology aspects other than GM 
that an aggressor nation could misuse in developing an offensive BW capability; 
important among the capabilities that could be misused are techniques for the 
large scale production of natural or modified micro organisms and toxins that 
are now established in a considerable number of countries. Further advances in 
capabilities of producing micro organisms and other biological agents are to be 
expected.  
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The UK submission, however,  also notes with some optimism that studies relating to the 
genetics of crop species are likely to result in the long-term in improvements in resistance 
to disease in plants and with that there is the suggestion that this might result in a 
reduction in the likelihood that crops might be targeted for purposes related to economic 
warfare.  
 
Sub-section 6 of the UK submission, titled: Microbial Control of Pests, addressed matters 
relating to biological control more directly. The UK notes the increase in emphasis in 
studies concerning environmental release of pathogens, and goes on to outline increase in 
research activities with bacteria, fungi, and viruses; and increases in the study of aspects 
of production, improvements in biological control formulations, and methods of 
dissemination, and simplification of production techniques. According to the UK23: 
 
The bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis is still the most widely used entomopathogen, 
but there is increasing research on about 20 of the several hundred 
entomopathogenic fungi known. Of the viruses, baculoviruses continue to receive 
the most attention. Aspects of the use of these micro organisms that are being 
studied include production, problems of low pathogenicity, and constraints posed 
by temperature and humidity in the field. Novel and improved formulation are 
being developed to extend shelf life and to extend residual activity in the field eg 
by the use of ultraviolet protectants. Formulations are also being developed to 
ensure compatibility with existing agricultural spray devices, to remove the need 
for dedicated high-cost equipment. Because Lepidoptera are far more of a 
problem in tropical areas, microbial control technology including ‘cottage 
industry’ production of pathogens is being developed in those areas with the help 
of the developed nations.  
 
In its concluding remarks to this subsection the UK notes increases in knowledge in the 
production of biological control agents and in methods relating to their dissemination, 
and notes the increased potential for misapplication. However, in its general conclusions 
whilst noting the relevance to the Convention of developments in this area the UK 
submission also notes an increase in the potential for improvements in areas related to 
development of defensive measures including improvements in identification and 
diagnosis of disease, and in the development of vaccines. 
 
The submission by the United States of America (USA) titled: Technological 
Developments of Relevance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, echoed 
the sentiments expressed in the concluding remarks of the UK submission noting 
increased potential for both misapplication and increased potential for the development of 
defensive measures. The US submission identified the area of Advances in Industrial 
Applications as most noteworthy with advances since 1986 in basic research and 
                                                 
23 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.BWC/CONF.III/4, p. 25. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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subsequent applications occurring across the fields of medicine, agriculture and industry. 
Matters relating to scientific and technological advances in the area of biological control 
were addressed in sub-section 2.2 titled: Advances in production. In regard to 
improvement in the production of bio pesticides, the US note the following: 
 
…once a suitable recombinant organism has been engineered, exploiting it 
becomes a matter of using established procedures. Biological production 
technology has proceeded to the point where large quantities of biological 
products can be produced quickly in small facilities….Two genetically altered 
pesticides are about to be approved for commercial use which represent a 
“second-generation” of bio pesticides which will not degrade quickly in the 
environment due to a microencapsulation process. 
 
The US submission goes on to note areas relating crops where scientific and 
technological improvements have resulted in the adaptation of cereals, forages, fibre 
crops and fruits and vegetables to environmental stresses caused by drought, cold, heat 
and toxic soil. 
 
In its concluding remarks the US submission warns that advances in biological 
technology have significantly complicated the issue of the verification of the Convention.  
 
As at the Second Review Conference, the Third Review Conference reaffirmed in its 
Final Declaration24 that the scope of the Convention covers all scientific and 
technological developments but also agreed to extended understandings of relevance to 
the area, inter alia, of biological control as follows: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms 
that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally 
covers all microbial agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, 
whatever their origin or method of production. 
 
 
Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 1996 
 
The Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference met in Geneva 9 and 10 
April 1996. As had happened prior to the Third Review Conference, The Preparatory 
Committee also requested the preparation of background papers by the Secretariat on the 
compliance by States Parties with all their obligations under the Convention and on new 
scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. The papers were 
                                                 
24  Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, Final Document, Part II, 
Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.III/23/Part II, Page 9. Available at: http://www.opbw.org. 
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distributed to States Parties prior to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention that was held in Geneva for two weeks from 25 November to 
6 December 1996.  
 
The review by States Parties dated 30 October 1996, on scientific and technological 
developments was, as during the Third Review Conference titled: Background Document 
on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction25. 
 
In its sub-section titled: Major Results, Cuba identified several areas where scientific and 
technological developments had taken place in the area of plants of relevance to the 
Convention.  
 
Development of diagnostics for detection of plant pathogens. 
Obtaining of transgenic plants and animals (sugar cane, cabbage, potatoes, tobacco, 
tilapia, rabbits, etc.) and commercial varieties of pest-resistant plants.  
Use of electron microscopy, serology and molecular biology for diagnosis of 
phytopathogenic micro organisms. 
Obtaining of antiserums and production of diagnostic kits for plant pathogens. 
Development of technologies for the biological production of substances for pest control 
in cultivated plants.  
Use of integrated management techniques for farm pest control. 
Development of commercial crops for commercial production of biological substances.  
Development of biological products for vector control: the larvicides “Griseler” (Bacillus 
sphaericus), “Bactive” (Bacillus thuringiensis); and the rodenticide “Biorat” (Samonella 
enteritidis). 
 
The UK submission assessed scientific and technological developments since the Third 
Review Conference and considered advances and changes in science, medicine and 
industrial applications. Under sub-sections 6 titled: Trends in infectious diseases and their 
treatment26, the UK submission draws attention to developments relating to biological 
control thus: 
 
Research has continued into new compounds active against plant pathogens, but 
there are still no anti-virus compounds and no good plant bactericides except for 
antibiotics (which are not approved for crop application in the United Kingdom 
and are relatively expensive to use). The is still a lack of fungicides affective 
against the important wilt pathogens in the genera Fusarium and Verticillum. 
Genetic modification of plants to express viral coat proteins and thus confer 
                                                 
25  Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.IV/4*. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
26  Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.IV/4*, p. 16. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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some protection against infection by the virus of viruses concerned is now 
relatively commonplace in research but such plant have not yet been released for 
commercial use in the United Kingdom…. 
 
More specifically and in detail, in sub section 8 titled: Microbial Control of Pests the UK 
offers an overview of developments in areas relating to bacteria, viruses, fungi, and 
improvements in diagnosis of plant disease. 
 
In regard to bacteria, the UK offers the following overview of developments: 
 
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) continues to be the most important agent being used 
to control insect pests. From fundamental studies of the mode of action of these 
bacteria and the use of advanced genetic modification techniques, Bt toxin genes 
have been transferred to create transgenic plants. This enables the plant to 
protect itself from pests by producing an insect-specific Bt toxin. The first major 
releases of commercial corps based on this principle have occurred, heralding 
what could turn out to be a major new era in environmentally benign farming 
avoiding the use of chemicals. The bacterium Bacillus sphaericus, pathogenic for 
some mosquito species, is another promising biological alternative for pest 
control.  
 
In regard to viruses, the UK offers the following overview of developments: 
 
The use of viruses to control insect pests has been advancing with the 
appearance of new commercial pesticides based on the nuclear polyhedrosis 
virus to control pest species resistant to chemicals. Genetic modification is also 
being used to improve the performance of these pathogens: new, faster acting 
strains of virus have been created by incorporating into the genome specific 
insect toxins derived from other animals such as scorpions. The creation of 
transgenic plants incorporating genes of insect viruses is also a promising new 
line of development in crop protection.  
 
In regard to fungi, the UK offers the following overview of developments: 
 
Fungal agents such as Metarhizium spp, and Beauvaria bassiana are being 
actively developed as biological control agents against important pests such as 
locusts in Africa and aphids on field crops.  
 
Significant advances in the development of diagnostics, and in the control of weeds, the 
latter resulting from developments in the area of the study of molecular biology are also 
described.  
 
The concluding remarks of the UK’s submission echoed previous submissions which 
balanced peaceful developments in this area and the potential for improvements 
regarding defensive measures against the world-wide spread of the science and 
technology and the increased potential for its misapplication.  
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The US submission again shared the sentiments expressed in the UK’s concluding 
remarks and in its submission identified major areas of scientific and technological 
development including the “fields of analytical developments and vaccinology, both of 
which have applications in the field of medicine and public health as well as in industry 
and agriculture”, and went on to note the importance of reviewing developments in basic 
research and in applications across the areas of biotechnology, molecular biology, 
medicine, microbiology, biochemical engineering, and pharmaceutical and vaccine 
production.   
 
In sub section 2.0 which addressed Advances in industrial applications of biotechnology, 
the US submission noted the dual use potential of modified micro organisms in the area 
of plants, thus: 
 
In the area of plant pathogens…developments are being pursued to produce 
environmentally safer and more effective pesticides. All of these developments 
can provide significant benefits to the public health and welfare of society, 
however, in examining these same developments from the point of view of the 
BWC, we cannot ignore the potential misuse of biotechnology to produce new 
biological agents or improve certain characteristics in those agents already 
recognised as potential biological agents. Transferring certain genetic 
characteristics into naturally occurring organisms can potentially create 
organisms of greater virulence, antibiotic resistance and environmental 
stability….A nearly infinite variety of biological compounds designed for specific 
uses and given specific characteristics is possible. 
 
The US submissions concluding remarks echoed the stance adopted at the previous 
Review Conference which again noted that compliance with the Convention has been 
“significantly complicated” by the new technologies.  
 
The submission by Sweden titled: Background Information on New Scientific and 
Technological Developments Relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 
identified the areas of biotechnology and genetic modification as those that have 
revolutionised biological and medical science and noted both potential benefits and the 
increased potential for misapplication. In particular, in regard to plants, under a 
subsection titled: Disease-causing mechanisms, the Swedish submission noted an 
increase in basic research into mechanisms of virulence – referred to as “shared strategies 
for causing disease”27 - that a number of plant pathogens share with bacterial pathogens 
affecting humans. According to the submission from Sweden: 
 
This shared strategy for virulence has led to an intense research where to goal is 
to target components of this system and to develop a common strategy to prevent 
infections be several different pathogens. But also here there is a potential threat 
that this knowledge can be misused to change the virulence of pathogens.  
 
                                                 
27  Ibid. Page 3.  
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Further to this under a sub-section titled: Release of genetically modified microorganisms 
in the environment, Sweden notes the increasing application of living microorganisms in 
medicine, industry and agriculture, the increase in knowledge in the behaviour of 
microorganisms in different environments, and increases in capacity for large-scale 
production.  
 
In its concluding remarks the Swedish submission notes the relevance to the Convention 
of developments in the area of biological control as follows28: 
 
The exploitation of biotechnology and the trend to establish commercial 
cooperation worldwide significantly contributes to the spread and increase of 
knowledge in this field of research and development. Continuing expansion of 
activities in industrial microbiology and increasing demand on control of 
survival and spread of microorganisms in the context of control of pests can have 
implications that have to be considered in relation to the BTWC.  
 
The German submission expressed concern regarding increased risk posed by the 
worldwide spread of biological technology together with acknowledgements relating to 
the potential of far-reaching benefits, in particular, in the area of advances in the rapid 
identification of agents, but no specific information relating to scientific and 
technological development in the area of biological control was included.  
 
As at the Third Review Conference, the Fourth Review Conference reaffirmed in its Final 
Declaration29 that the scope of the Convention covers all scientific and technological 
developments but also agreed to extended understandings of relevance to the area, inter 
alia, of bio-control as follows: 
 
2. The Conference reaffirms that the Convention prohibits the development, 
production, stockpiling, other acquisition or retention of microbial or other 
biological agents or toxins harmful to plants and animals, as well as humans, of 
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or 
other peaceful purposes.  
…. 
 
5. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or 
altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes.  
 
                                                 
28 Op cit. Page 7.  
29 Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, Final Document, Part II, 
Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9/Part II, Page 14. Available at: http://www.opbw.org. 
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6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific 
and technological developments, inter alia, in the felids of microbiology, 
biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications 
resulting from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provision of the Convention, reaffirms 
that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments.  
  
 
Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 2001 
 
The Preparatory Committee met in Geneva from 25 to 27 April 2001. As had happened 
prior to the Fourth Review Conference, the Preparatory Committee also requested, the 
preparation by the Secretariat of background papers on compliance by States Parties with 
all their obligations under the Convention and on new scientific and technological 
developments of relevance to the Convention. As had happened prior to the Fourth 
Review Conference this information should cover developments relating to scientific and 
technological applications and their relevance to various aspects of the Convention. The 
papers were distributed to States Parties prior to the Fifth Review Conference which was 
held in Geneva between 19 November and 7 December 2001. 
 
The review30 by States Parties dated 14 September 2001, on scientific and technological 
developments was, as during the Fourth Review Conference titled: Background 
Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The latter 
review contained information submitted by the following countries: Bulgaria, South 
Africa, Sweden, United States of America. Further to this, a submission by the United 
Kingdom31 was circulated by the Secretariat also titled: Background Document on New 
Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. 
 
A great deal more information of relevance to biological control was included in the 
reviews of scientific and technological developments at the Fifth Review Conference 
with the UK’s submission also covering a broad-range of issues relevant to the 
Convention in significant detail and numbering some 29 pages. In its sub-section titled: 
Pest control in agriculture32, the UK submission noted the world-wide spread of 
                                                 
30 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. BWC/CONF.V/4, 14 September 2001. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
31 Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. BWC/CONF.V/4/Add.1, dated 26 October 2001. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
32  Ibid. Page 21. 
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agricultural applications involving genetic modification in disease control. In regard to 
applications involving crops inserted with the Bt toxin expressing gene, the following 
data cited suggest widespread application thus: 
 
Data for 2000 indicates that, of the 29 million hectares of genetically modified 
crops grown in the USA, Argentina and Canada, 24% was transgenic maize 
(corn) or cotton hybrids containing cry genes derived from Bt. China, Mexico 
and Australia are also major growers of these Bt crops, and commercial 
production in India is planned. In many cases Bt crops allow use of chemical 
pesticide to be reduced, and there have been reports of significant increases in 
yields and profits. 
 
The UK submission also notes the large number of laboratory and epidemiological 
studies relating to the potential risks to human health and the environment of direct 
applications of Bt as an insecticide. With regard to methods of dissemination and 
facilities involved in the production of biological control agents, the UK submission in its 
concluding remarks to this subsection notes33 that: 
 
Some of the above technologies, including microbial manufacturing plants and 
field delivery systems, could be misused in illicit BW programmes. 
 
Under a subsection titled: Use of pathogens to control weeds and ‘criminal’ crops, the 
UK addresses the controversial issue of the use of biological control against drug crops 
such as coca, opium and marijuana and notes that a number of countries are supporting 
the UN Drug Control Programme for the use in this context of ‘bioherbicides’. The 
agents in question, according to the UK include: 
 
The fungus Fusarium … considered for use against coca plants from which 
cocaine is manufactured, and another fungus, Pleospora papaveracae, [which] 
is being considered to attack opium poppies.  
 
This subsection also notes environmental concerns that have been raised in connection 
with the above and includes a recommendation that the Fifth Review Conference address 
this issue directly.  
 
The US submission34 contains an overview of advances across a broad range of fields 
including genetic modification, genomics, proteomics, bioremeidiation, biocontrol 
agents, vaccine developments and bioinformatics and reports the growth across a broad 
range of areas of concern for the BTWC including advances in genomics, proteomics, 
computational biology, and industrial biotechnology.  
 
                                                 
33  Op cit. Page 22.  
34  Background Document on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. BWC/CONF.V/4, 14 September 2001, page 13. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
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However, in its review of scientific and technological developments since the Fourth 
Review Conference, the US submission raises and number of issues which bring into 
question assumptions held about anticipated demand in the agricultural sector for 
biological control agents; and, further raises issues which challenges claims that the 
biological control industry might be a source of BW proliferation. In regard to the former 
the US submission notes35: 
 
An expected surge in demand for biopesticides arising from increasing 
environmental awareness has failed to materialize. The lack of demand for 
biopesticides has resulted from the fact that biopesticides, are: (1) not as 
effective or consistent, (2) work slower, (3) cost more to produce, (4) have a 
limed pest spectrum, and (5) are more difficult to store when compared to 
chemical pesticides. Given such limitations, all of these factors affect the 
viability of this technical discipline.  
 
Further, in regard to the biological control industry as a source of  proliferation concern, 
the US submission notes the following: 
 
Reliance on adaptive technology makes it highly unlikely that biocontrol woud be 
a source of unique or special processes or techniques that would enable BW 
proliferation. This is not to say that facilities used to produce biocontrol agents 
couldn’t be exploited for dual-use purposes. For example, facilities that produce 
Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) as a biopesticide could easily be converted to produce 
anthrax (Bacillus anthracis) within a matter of days. However, this is not unique 
to this industry.  
 
The Swedish submission set out a detailed overview of scientific and technological 
development relevant to the Convention and identified a number of areas were the impact 
of the rapid spread of biotechnology was in evidence. This submission was organised 
around the following subsections: Genomics, protecomics and treatment of disease; 
Vaccines; Industrial microbiology and production; and Identification of disease causing 
agents. The issue of biological control was not addressed directly in the Swedish 
submission although the worldwide increase in applications across a broad range of areas 
including agriculture is noted. The Swedish submission also identified developments 
relating to Industrial microbiology and production as an area of particular relevance to 
the BTWC: 
 
Large-scale production of biological active substances, with a microbiological 
agent origin, in relatively small production facilities, is also possible due to 
biotechnological development. Within the pharmaceutical industry research is 
intense for methods to stabilize drugs for aerosol or oral delivery of, for example 
toxins, chimeric toxins, modulators of the immune system and bioregulators. The 
outcome of this research could also increase the risk for development of more 
stable biological and toxin weapons.  
 
                                                 
35 Ibid. Page 22.  
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The Bulgarian submission related details of domestic research and development activities 
on combating infectious and parasitic diseases and epidemiology and in the area of the 
development of anti-viral prophylaxis but reports no activity in regard to scientific and 
technological development on biological control relevant to the Convention. 
 
The South African submission36 commented extensively and in considerable detail in 
regard to developments relating to biological control and plant inoculants relevant to the 
Convention. In terms of definitions both the former and the latter are defined thus: 
 
A plant inoculant is a formulation containing pure or predetermined mixtures of 
living micro organisms for the treatment of seed, seedlings or other plant 
propagation material for the purpose of enhancing the growth capabilities or 
disease resistance of the eventual plants or crops.  
 
In contrast biocontrol agents are defined thus: 
 
A Biocontrol agent can be defined as a living organism or biologically active 
substance originating from such an organism, used for the prevention, 
elimination or deduction of plant disease, pests or unwanted plants.  
 
In regard to plant inoculants, separate detailed subsections of the South African 
submission give an overview of: the history of their use and development; their purpose, 
their mode of action; types of inoculants; methods of inoculation; production methods; 
and, the relevance of plant inoculants for the BTWC. And in regard to biocontrol agents, 
separate detailed subsections of the South African submission give an overview of: 
differing approaches to biological control; the complexity of factors affecting their 
application; and biological agents against plants – the latter including the controversial 
area of attacking drug crops. However, the object here is to draw attention to the 
conclusions to this subsection which suggest the relevance of biological control agents 
and plant inoculants to the Convention. 
 
According to the South African submission37 plant inoculants are relevant to the 
Convention in terms of: 
 
a. A growing industry and more sophisticated production facilities that have the 
potential to be diverted to BW producing facilities, as in the case of vaccine 
production facilities.  
b. The genetic research and development that is conducted to improve the micro- 
organisms that form the active ingredients of inoculants.  
c. The development of liquid inoculants that will make their application by 
spraying and aerosolisation a possibility. 
 
                                                 
36  Op cit. Page 5. 
37  Op cit. Page 7.  
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Whereas the control of plant pests, weeds and plants with biological control agents are 
relevant to the Convention in terms of: 
 
a. The less clear distinction between the peaceful use of biocontrol agents and 
their use as BW due to the dual use nature of these agents.  
b. Undesired plants, exotic plants or even noxious plant in one country may be 
natural, essential and in many cases utilised for commercial purposes (crops) in 
other countries. 
 
Fifth Review Conference resulted in the failure of States Parties in producing Final 
Declaration and although agreement on an inter-Review Conference process was agreed 
by States Parties when the Fifth Review Conference resumed in Geneva, 11 November 
2002, no attempt was made to produce a Final Declaration and thus, as Pearson and 
Sims38 have pointed out,  “the opportunity to continue to strengthen the Convention 
through further extension of the understandings agreed at previous Review Conferences 
was missed.” 
 
The latter concludes this overview of the various periodic reviews of scientific and 
technological developments in the area of biological control relevant to the Convention 
and demonstrates the increasing concern that has been expressed during the course of the 
Review Conference process, since entry-into-force of the Convention, regarding the 
world-wide spread of dual use scientific and technological knowledge in this area; and in 
the area of the increasing extent of the emergence of dual use applications, and 
production facilities.  
 
As at previous Review Conferences the Preparatory Committee will be prior to the Sixth 
Review Conference in 2006, requesting that Co-Depositories and States Parties submit 
their views on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. 
The reviews are a vital component in the Review Conference process and inform action 
by Co-Depositaries and States Parties in regard to the formulation of and agreement on 
re-affirmations and extended understandings and their subsequent incorporation into the 
Final Declaration of the up-coming Sixth Review Conference. Co-Depositaries and States 
Parties in drafting their reviews should be mindful of, inter alia, increasing concerns that 
have been raised in connection with scientific and technological developments in the area 
of biological control as outlined above.  
 
 
Confidence Building Measures 
 
                                                 
38 Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 10: Preparing for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006, 
by Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, February 2005. Available at: 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_10.pdf 
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Further to the above, another vital component in strengthening the prohibition regime lies 
in qualitative – and quantitative39 - improvements in the area of BTWC confidence 
building measures.  As agreed in the Final Declaration of  Second Review Conference 
States Parties decided to hold an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from 
States Parties to finalize the modalities for the exchange of information and data in regard 
to measures to be implemented on the basis of mutual cooperation, soon to be called 
confidence-building measures, in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of 
ambiguities, doubts and suspicions.   This ad hoc meeting40 was held in Geneva from 31 
March to 15 April 1987 and agreed the modalities for the exchange of information and 
data to implement the agreed confidence-building measures.  
 
The four confidence-building measures, which were subsequently elaborated upon in 
March / April 1987, addressed the following: 
 
1. Exchange of data, including name, location, scope and general 
description of activities, on research centres and laboratories that meet very high 
national or international safety standards established for handling, for permitted 
purposes, biological materials that pose a high individual and community risk or 
specialise in permitted biological activities directly related to the Convention. 
 
2. Exchange of information on all outbreaks of infectious disease and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern as 
regards type, development, place, or time of occurrence. If possible, the 
information provided would include, as soon as it is available, data on the type 
of disease, approximate area affected, and number of cases. 
 
3. Encouragement of publication of results of biological research directly 
related to the Convention, in scientific journals generally available to States 
Parties, as well as promotion of use for permitted purposes of knowledge gained 
in this research. 
 
4. Active promotion of contacts between scientists engaged in biological 
research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges for joint 
research on a mutual agreed basis. 
 
The confidence building measures agreed at the Second Review Conference were again 
extended41 at the Third Review Conference thus to include: 
                                                 
39 For a discussion on Confidence Building Measures see: Bradford Briefing Paper No. 11, Preparing for a 
Successful Outcome to the BTWC Sixth Review Conference in 2006, by Jez Littlewood, December 2003. 
Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/BP_11_2ndseries.pdf 
40 United Nations, Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States Parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Geneva, 31 March-15 April 1987, 
BWC/CONF.II/EX/2, 21 April 1987. Available at http://www.opbw.org. 
41 Graham S. Pearson, Briefing Paper No 14 (Second Series) Two Decades of Strengthening CBW 
Prohibitions: Priorities for the BTWC in the 21st Century, November 2004, p. 18. Available at: 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/BP_14_2ndseries.pdf 
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1. Declaration form on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare" 
 
2. Confidence-building measure "A": 
 
- Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories; 
 
- Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence research 
and development programmes. 
 
3. Confidence-building measure "B": 
 
- Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins. 
 
4. Confidence-building measure "C": 
 
 - Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of 
knowledge. 
 
5. Confidence-building measure "D": 
 
 - Active promotion of contacts. 
 
6. Confidence-building measure "E": 
 
 - Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures. 
 
7. Confidence-building measure "F": 
 
- Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological 
research and development programmes. 
 
8. Confidence-building measure "G": 
 
- Declaration of vaccine production facilities. 
 
Confidence building measures were again the subject of revisions and additions in 1991 
and although the measures originally agreed by States Parties in 1986 have been 
politically binding their success has been hampered by low submission rates42.  
However, in the light of concerns that have been expressed in regard to scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the area of biological control, Co-Depositaries 
                                                 
42  For a further discussion on Confidence Building Measures see Bradford Briefing Paper No. 10, Towards 
the BTWC Sixth Review Conference: Making the Best Use of the 26 March 2005 Anniversary, by 
Nicholas A. Sims, December 2003. Available at: 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/BP_10_2ndseries.pdf 
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and States Parties might give effect to such concerns by giving careful consideration at 
the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention in 2006 to the proposals to strengthen 
confidence building measures as set out in the Working Paper43 titled: Strengthening 
Confidence Building Measures as submitted to the Fifth Review Conference in 2001 by 
South Africa so that CBM declarations are extended to include research and 
production facilities working with working with animal and plant pathogens, as well 
as research and production facilities relevant to humans. Whilst the Proposals set forth in 
this Working Paper for Strengthening CBM Declarations as submitted by South Africa to 
the Fifth Review Conference is included below (as Appendix A), the justification for 
strengthening CBM declarations as recommended to the Fifth Review Conference by 
South Africa are set forth as follows: 
 
a. The Confidence-Building Measures as defined by the Third Review 
Conference provide only for declarations relevant to humans in terms of 
research facilities and production facilities. 
 
b. Similar facilities working with animal or plant pathogens are equally relevant 
to the Convention and should therefore be declared in the CBM declarations.  
 
Conclusion 
Re-affirmations and extended understandings as expressed in the Final Declaration of the 
Sixth Review Conference, together with the strengthening of CBM’s, form vital elements 
in re-affirming that scientific and technological developments, inter alia, in the area of 
biological control are covered by the prohibtions in the Convention; and in increasing 
levels of transparency in regard to Co-Depositaries and States Parties compliance with 
the Convention. It is vital that both re-affirmations and extended understandings and 
strengthened confidence building measures be pursued in earnest by the States Parties at 
the Sixth Review Conference of the Convention in 2006. 
 
                                                 
43 Working Paper by South Africa: Strengthening Confidence Building Measures, 
BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1, 16 November 2001. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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Appendix A.  
 
 
 
Strengthening Confidence-Building Measures 
 
Working paper by South Africa 
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Introduction 
 
The Confidence-Building Measures as defined by the Third Review Conference provide 
only for declarations relevant to humans in terms of research facilities and production facilities.  
 
Similar facilities working with animal or plant pathogens are equally relevant to the 
Convention and should therefore also be declared in the CBM Declarations. 
 
PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING CBM DECLARATIONS 
 
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE “A” 
 
It is proposed that the text describing the modalities for CBM “A” be amended to read: 
 
“The Fifth Review Conference agreed that data should be provided by States Parties on 
each facility, within their territory or under their jurisdiction or control anywhere, which has any 
maximum containment laboratories meeting those criteria for such maximum containment 
laboratories as specified in the 1993 WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual such as those designated 
as biosafety level 4 (BL4) or P4 or equivalent standards; or those designed and used to handle 
and work with biological agents causing disease and known or suspected to meet the 
classification criteria of Group 4 animal pathogens, as determined by each State Party for 
itself and specified in the Amendment to the International Animal Health Code adopted by 
the International Committee of the Organisation Internationale des Epizootics during its 
66th General Session, 1998.”   
(Proposed text in bold) 
 
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE “G” 
 
It is proposed that the text describing the modalities for CBM “G” be amended to read: 
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- Declaration of Vaccine production facilities 
 
 “To further increase the transparency of biological research and development related to the 
Convention and to broaden scientific and technical knowledge as agreed in Article X, each State 
Party will declare all facilities, both governmental and non-governmental, within its territory or under 
its jurisdiction or control anywhere, producing:  vaccines licensed by the State Party for the 
protection of humans.  
 
(a) Any vaccine for humans that is for the general public or for armed forces, or 
which was licensed, registered or otherwise approved by a component of the 
government of the State Party for distribution or sale; 
 
(b) Any vaccine for animals that is available to the general public, or which was 
licensed, registered or otherwise approved by a component of the 
government of the State Party for distribution or sale. 
 
Information shall be provided on Form G attached.”  (Proposed text in bold; text to be deleted, 
struck out). 
 
ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE “H” 
 
 - Declaration of plant inoculant and biocontrol agent production facilities  
 
 “To further increase the transparency of biological research and development 
related to the Convention and to broaden scientific and technical knowledge as agreed in 
Article X, each State Party will declare all facilities, both governmental and non-
governmental, within its territory or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, producing 
biocontrol agents or plant inoculants. Information shall be provided on Form “H” attached.  
 
Modalities 
 
 The Fifth Review Conference agreed the following definitions: 
 
 Biocontrol agent means a living organism or biologically active substance 
originating from such an organism used for the prevention, elimination or reduction of plant 
diseases, pests or unwanted plants. 
 
 Plant inoculant means any formulation containing a pure culture or a predetermined 
mixture of micro-organisms that alter the properties of plants or crops. 
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      Form H 
 
 
Declaration of biocontrol agent and plant inoculant production facilities   
 
1. Name of facility: 
 
2. Location (mailing address) : 
 
3. General description of the products produced: 
 
 
________ 
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